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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-3358 
___________ 
 
JOSEPH DIGENOVA,  
Banquet Server on Call, 
              Appellant 
 
v. 
 
UNITE HERE LOCAL 274; PHILADELPHIA  
JOINT BOARD, Previous Unite Here Local 274 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-15-cv-04143) 
District Judge:  Honorable Michael M. Baylson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 8, 2016 
 
Before: CHAGARES, KRAUSE and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: December 20, 2016) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Joseph DiGenova appeals from the District Court’s denial of his motion for 
reconsideration following the dismissal of his amended complaint.  We will affirm. 
I. 
 Joseph DiGenova is employed as a banquet server.  His precise employment 
arrangement is not clear from his filings, but it appears that he is affiliated with a union 
called UNITE HERE Local 274 (apparently the successor to Philadelphia Joint Board 
Local 274).  DiGenova has filed numerous complaints against his union over the years, 
including a series of complaints in 2013 that the District Court dismissed as 
unintelligible.  DiGenova did not appeal.   
 This action concerns another such complaint, which DiGenova filed pro se.  The 
District Court granted DiGenova leave to proceed in forma pauperis, screened the 
complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), and dismissed it without prejudice for failure 
to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) and for failure to state a claim.  The District Court 
construed DiGenova’a complaint as an attempt to assert a claim for age discrimination, 
but it concluded that the complaint did not adequately set forth any basis for such a claim.  
The District Court also granted DiGenova leave to amend. 
 DiGenova then filed an amended complaint.  The District Court dismissed the 
amended complaint too, this time with prejudice, for failure to comply with Rule 8(a).  
The District Court concluded that DiGenova had merely “cobbled together a number of 
documents with incoherent statements, attachments, and letters from third parties” and 
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once again did not set forth any discernible claim.  (ECF No. 5.)1  DiGenova then filed a 
document titled “motion,” which we construe as a timely Rule 59(e) motion for 
reconsideration.  The District Court denied it, and DiGenova now appeals.2 
II. 
 Having reviewed the record, we cannot say that the District Court abused its 
discretion in dismissing DiGenova’s amended complaint under Rule 8.  The documents 
that DiGenova submitted as his amended complaint do not contain a “short and plain 
statement” of any claim, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and DiGenova’s allegations are not 
“simple, concise, and direct,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1).   
 DiGenova’s amended complaint also fails to state any plausible claim to relief on 
the merits.  DiGenova’s amended complaint makes stray references to “discrimination,” 
but none of his filings—including his brief on appeal—suggests any basis for any 
                                              
1 Among the attachments was a 2015 letter from a lawyer advising DiGenova that he was 
“unable to discern” an evidentiary basis for a claim of age discrimination and advising 
him to consult a labor lawyer concerning his other grievances.  (ECF No. 4 at 6-7.) 
 
2 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C § 1291.  DiGenova’s appeal from the order 
denying reconsideration brings up for review the underlying order dismissing his 
amended complaint.  See Long v. Atl. City Police Dep’t, 670 F.3d 436, 446 n. 20 (3d 
Cir.2012).  Although our review of the dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a 
claim is plenary, see Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 218 (3d Cir. 
2015), we review the District Court’s dismissal of a complaint for failure to comply with 
Rule 8 only for abuse of discretion, see In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 702 
(3d Cir. 1996).  We review the denial of reconsideration for abuse of discretion as well.  
See Addie v. Kjaer, 737 F.3d 854, 867 (3d Cir. 2013). 
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plausible claim in that regard.3  DiGenova’s amended complaint otherwise consists 
entirely of conclusory assertions in various documents of fraud and other misconduct 
dating back to 2005.4  Thus, we conclude that DiGenova failed to state any plausible 
claim.  We further conclude that the District Court did not err in denying reconsideration 
or in declining to grant DiGenova leave to further amend. 
 We briefly address four other issues.  First, DiGenova asserts in his notice of 
appeal that “there is nothing confusing about this case” because “it is about Lilly 
Ledbetter Law equal pay for equal work[.]”  (ECF No. 8 at 2.)  The Lilly Ledbetter Fair 
Pay Act of 2009 enacted a statute of limitations that is not related to the District Court’s 
reason for dismissing DiGenova’s amended complaint or to the reasons why it fails to 
                                              
3 DiGenova’s amended complaint contains three assertions potentially relevant to a claim 
of age discrimination.  First, DiGenova asserts that he complained to the Philadelphia 
Human Relations Commission “about loss of work age discrimination (protected class).”  
(ECF No. 4 at 2.)  Second, he attached a “position statement” asserting that a previous 
booking agent gave work to her own children, who are less than 40 years old.  (Id. at 8.)  
Finally, he attached a letter to UNITE HERE asserting that servers under 40 years of age 
are given preferential treatment by being permitted to use serving carts instead of trays.  
(Id. at 30.)  DiGenova provides no further detail in support of these assertions, which are 
contained in different documents and which he does not tie together in any way.  
  
4 DiGenova alleges without further explanation that: (1) he and other members on an “A” 
list of servers have lost $150,000 in wages since 2005; (2) UNITE HERE lied and 
defamed him during an investigation by the Philadelphia Human Relations Commission; 
(3) he has no pension because of “discrimination” and poor record keeping by the unions; 
(4) the 2010 transition from Philadelphia Joint Board to UNITE HERE was accomplished 
in a “fraudulent” manner; (5) UNITE HERE removed his former position as shop steward 
in 2010 without authorization and encouraged hotels to breach their contracts; and (6) he 
reported a “fraudulent” preferred server list to the U.S. Department of Justice in 2014. 
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state a plausible claim to relief.  See Noel v. Boeing Co., 622 F.3d 266, 270-71 (3d Cir. 
2010) (discussing the Act). 
 Second, DiGenova refers in his brief to the “LMRDA,” which appears to be the  
Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.  (Appellant’s Br. at 5.)  
DiGenova, however, does not make any specific argument or assertion suggesting that he 
has stated or could state any plausible claim in that regard. 
 Third, DiGenova notes in his brief that he filed another action in the District Court 
regarding additional grievances against his union, and he requests that we remand this 
matter for the District Court to consider them together.  The District Court has since 
dismissed DiGenova’s new action (E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 2-16-cv-01222), and there is no 
basis to remand this matter in any event. 
 Finally, we note that DiGenova requested appointment of counsel in all of his 
filings in the District Court.  The District Court did not address that issue.  We perceive 
no reversible error in that regard, however, because none of DiGenova’s filings suggests 
that he has any potentially meritorious claim.  See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155 (3d 
Cir. 1993) (addressing appointment of counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915); Ficken v. 
Alvarez, 146 F.3d 978, 979-80 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (addressing appointment of counsel 
under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)).  Without any basis to conclude that any such claims 
might be potentially valid we cannot say that the District Court erred by not appointing 
counsel or in dismissing DiGenova’s amended complaint. 
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III. 
 For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
